Author Archives: medcon

Early January Update

IIGOP Annual Report

Following its care.data report at the end of last year, the 2014 Annual Report of Dame Fiona Caldicott’s Independent Information Governance Oversight Panel (IIGOP) was published in early January. Amongst other things, it says:

In summary, the goal should be a state of information governance in which the following proposition prevails: “Organisations have no hiding places, the public have no surprises.”

But with good progress having been made on just six of the year-long Caldicott2 Review’s 26 recommendations, the IIGOP is forced to conclude:

Unfortunately the cultural change that we called for [in 2013] in relation to information governance has only emerged in parts of the system.

The annual report goes into some detail on care.data in Chapter 3, noting:

The unintended consequence of care.data was a positive cycle of change, with greater public interest causing organisations to respond with greater transparency and stronger information governance.

But, worryingly, on consent across the health and care system:

IIGOP welcomes the Secretary of State’s enhancement of the “right to object” in the care.data programme, but calls for a more consistent approach. It is not reasonable to expect the public to understand objections and “opt outs” if there are different rules for different programmes. This remains unfinished business.

Over the next few weeks, we will see whether the Government and NHS England are moving towards that goal – or whether they’ve been hiding more surprises for the public later in the year.

Meanwhile, Healthwatch England “found disturbing evidence of the harm caused by failure to share information appropriately. The inquiry focused on the experiences of older people, people with mental health conditions and people who are homeless.”

The findings, summarised on pages 17 and 18 of the annual report, are especially horrifying due to the impacts on the direct care of patients – a missed opportunity cost due to the care.data programme:

Public opinion research has shown that most patients want any healthcare professional who treats them to have secure electronic access to key data from their GP health record. Most were surprised that emergency care doctors do not have automatic access to records, and concerned that lack of access may lead to delays in treatment and fatal errors. The public’s main concerns about the use of information about them were suspicions around usage creep, lack of personal benefits and loss of data.

As medConfidential has always said, there need be no conflict between good ethics, good data handling and good medical care.
A Statutory Data Guardian?

We had hoped that, as the Secretary of State said would happen, the National Data Guardian – providing independent, overarching information oversight for the entire health and care system – would be put on a statutory footing “at the earliest opportunity”. That opportunity was last Friday, but the Secretary of State failed to meet his commitment.

As we now discover from the IIGOP’s Annual Report, this is just one example of what happened without a strong oversight body:

NHS England communicated the proposal in a leaflet that was supposed to be delivered to all homes across England in January 2014. A copy of the intended leaflet was sent to IIGOP shortly before the quarterly meeting of the panel on 9th December 2013. On the following day IIGOP advised NHS England that its leaflet was not fit for purpose, but was informed that it had already been sent to the printers and would not be recalled.

Last Friday, Jeremy Lefroy’s Private Member’s Bill reached its final stage in the House of Commons, and has now moved on to the Lords. When the NHS Number is used beyond the NHS, its wider use a lifelong identifier for every person in the UK will also never be recalled. We wrote a briefing on this issue when it first raised its head.

 

Anniversary

2015 marks 10 years since the dodgy deal between the (then) NHS Information Centre and Dr Foster Ltd – a period during which, as we now know, less-than-optimal decisions were made.

One quote in the Public Accounts Committee’s report that sounds entirely familiar from the care.data fiasco a decade on:

At the outset there was an urgency to complete the deal with Dr Foster Ltd, and in negotiating the joint venture the roles and responsibilities of the Department’s advisors were sometimes confused.

With echoes of the messy “IG Universe” picture that emerged last year, and with venture capitalists that now own bits of the private sector part of Dr Foster Ltd writing down their stake and seeking an exit, we see once again that – in the long term – routing round or failing to institute and apply proper Information Governance doesn’t help anyone.

Finally, as the 12 month mark approaches, we understand the Health Select Committee will continue its inquiry into care.data and the handling of NHS patients’ records shortly. Let’s hope that this time its members will be given full and frank evidence by all.

[PRESS RELEASE] 27 fundamental areas of concern: 52 unanswered questions for NHS England on their care.data scheme

For immediate release – Thursday 18th December

The Independent Information Governance Oversight Panel (IIGOP), chaired by Dame Fiona Caldicott, published its report [1] to the care.data Programme Board this afternoon.

Responding, NHS England has welcomed Dame Fiona’s “observations and the insight it offers”, and will “discuss the report further once we have had the opportunity to speak with our colleagues in the pathfinder areas”.

The report lists 27 areas of concern for the care.data Programme Board itself, containing some 52 unanswered questions, with 7 additional tests that pathfinder CCGs must meet.

The sheer number of unanswered questions indicates just how fundamentally misconceived care.data was from its inception, and at this stage – 10 months after the programme was stopped – suggests continued mishandling by those inside the care.data bunker at NHS England.

Questions raised in February remain unanswered at Christmas. No doubt someone at NHS England will find a lump of coal under the tree when they’re at their desk next week.

Phil Booth, coordinator of medConfidential, said:

“It’s up to NHS England whether care.data in 2015 will be handled as badly as in 2014. Discussing questions to which they should already have answers with people they’ve been discussing with for months risks repeating the same failures over again. This needs a second reset [2].

“It all boils down to what will patients be told? What will actually happen? And who will make sure that all of this is true? Quite clearly Dame Fiona, and the public at large, still don’t know.”

Notes for Editors:
1) The Independent Information Governance Oversight Panel’s report to the care.data Programme Board on the care.data Pathfinder stage: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/389219/IIGOP_care.data.pdf

2) “The re-constitution of the programme board follows recommendations from the Major Project Authority’s Project Validation Review”. Chair’s notes from care.data Advisory Board meeting on the 25th June: http://www.england.nhs.uk/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/ad-grp-notes-250614.pdf

medConfidential campaigns for confidentiality and consent in health and social care, seeking to ensure that every flow of data into, across and out of the NHS and care system is consensual, safe and transparent. Founded in January 2013, medConfidential is an independent, non-partisan organisation working with patients and medics, service users and care professionals.

For further information or for immediate or future interview, please contact Phil Booth, coordinator of medConfidential – phil@medconfidential.org

– ends –

Early December update

Ahead of Tuesday afternoon’s Commons Health Select Committee session with Jeremy Hunt, we’ve published a briefing with some current questions for the Secretary of State for Health. Hopefully the Committee will get chance to ask one of them.

As a result of the care.data Advisory Group public meeting in Manchester and recent press coverage, we have also written directly to both the Secretary of State and NHS England Chief Executive, Simon Stevens, about matters of increasing concern in NHS England’s approach to care.data. We look forward to public statements on the substantive issues we have raised, certainly before any ‘pathfinder’ is to proceed.

Last Friday, 5 December, HSCIC held another event as part of their post-Partridge Review process. The Information Centre has made a number of positive changes since the Partridge Review, and we hope this approach continues into the future. Unfortunately, HSCIC is often hampered by the decisions – or lack thereof – of NHS England, which has clearly not gone through the same level of reflection and renewal on consent and data issues since the care.data debacle earlier this year.

It remains to be seen if the Department of Health itself wishes to be more like HSCIC than NHS England. With the Secretary of State’s commitment that the role of National Data Guardian will be made a statutory body “at the earliest opportunity” and an amendment to Jeremy Lefroy’s Private Members’ Bill to do just that, the opportunity is there (see our Bill Committee briefing). Given weasel words that have been used before, it is actions that are required from the Secretary of State to deliver on his promising words.

We have also proposed a second clarification amendment to Jeremy Lefroy’s Bill – for a transparent register of every body authorised to make use of the NHS number – which we hope to see adopted at Committee Stage in the Commons, followed by Third Reading and all of the stages in the Lords before the election. And we note even a draft of the Regulations to define “the promotion of health”, sanctions for misuse and the rules and operation of the Confidentiality Advisory Group have yet to be published. There is a long way to go.

Speaking of a long way to go, we have still heard very little about the Department of Health’s proposed changes around “Accredited Safe Havens”. From what we do hear, we are increasingly concerned that they may allow data to be reused in “misguided, but well-meaning” ways, by entities that would cause significant concern were they to access data they might be a little too eager to get.

This week is the first Leadership Meeting of the Department of Health’s National Information Board (NIB) since the lay members were appointed. The event will be broadcast live on Tuesday morning. While usually paid to be one half of medConfidential, Sam Smith has been appointed by the Department of Health as a lay member – “like a non-executive director” – solely in a personal capacity, and sits on the Board on that basis.

 

It’s Christmas…

We deeply appreciate every donation you give us and especially the messages you include with them, whatever the amount… £5, £50 or more. We know each donation is an expression of individual support for what we are doing and the good wishes that come along with that.

medConfidential is a tiny organisation, hitting well above its weight, but to keep going we have to find around £60k per year. If you are – or know – someone who could make a substantial contribution towards our operating costs, please get in touch – coordinator@medconfidential.org .

Seasons Greetings to all – there’ll be one more update before the end of the year.

medConfidential Bulletin, 7 November 2014

What just happened?

The MP for Stafford, Jeremy Lefroy, has introduced a Private Members’ Bill that would amongst other things mandate the use of NHS numbers as “consistent identifiers” across health and social care.

We have some concerns about potential unintended consequences of the proposed legislation but believe these can be addressed at the upcoming Committee stage, to which the Bill was sent this morning. We’ll be starting to engage with specific MPs on the Committee from next week.

What is in care.data?

As NHS England begins to ramp up again towards the ‘pathfinder’ stage (see our last newsletter) the new narrative seems to be that the data to be extracted from your GP record is only “codes”. Quite aside from the fact that each item will be associated with your NHS number, date of birth, full postcode, gender and ethnicity, these codes are not secret – they are published, and even used in adverts on the sides of trains.

To help you understand the breadth of the information to be extracted under the current version of care.data, we have put together an online tool to let you search and read the diagnoses, treatments and other ‘events’ described by the codes. All the events within the care.data GP dataset will have dates attached and be linked to every other medical diagnosis you have on the dataset, or that can be inferred from your prescriptions.

Click on the link below to search or browse the information that will be extracted from your GP record under care.data:

N.B. The page may initially take a minute or so to load as it contains a significant amount of information.

Where does your data go, and why?

You should know where your medical records have gone, and why (longer version).

Whether you have opted in or out of care.data, there are a whole host of other data flows that relate both to direct care and to all the other things that happen around the NHS. You may have a Summary Care Record (SCR), and your hospital (HES) records may – or may not – be sent to various places depending on your consent where it is applied, and irrespective of your consent where it isn’t.

If you don’t know where your data has gone, there’s no way to know whether your wishes are being respected. And when there is a problem, there’s no way to know whether you personally were affected. In September, we produced an example of such a personalised data usage report [PDF] that we believe should be available to every patient.

Without a full commitment to individuals knowing where their data goes – and this must be for everyone, not just those who don’t choose to opt out – there will continue to be mistakes caused by secrecy that would be catastrophic to public trust in the handling of NHS patients’ data.

More details on data usage reports.

What next?

Though the care.data ‘pathfinder’ areas have been announced – Leeds (3 CCGs: West / North / South and East), Blackburn with Darwen CCG, West Hampshire CCG and Somerset CCG – we still don’t know which practices will be participating, and are waiting to see exactly what patients and GPs will be told.

With new Regulations and Directions still to be published, including clarification on the definition of “promotion of health” and sanctions for misuse, and with issues such as commercial re-use and access to patient data after the pathfinder stage still to be resolved, a number of crucial concerns must be addressed before the scheme moves forward.

We shall, of course, keep you updated as more information becomes available.

Meanwhile, the next Open Meeting of the care.data Advisory Group, on which medConfidential sits, will be held in central Manchester on 26 November. This will be the third in a series of public events where patients have the chance to ask questions about care.data and hear directly from NHS England. For more details or to register to attend, please visit the Open Meeting webpage.

And finally

Thank you for all your support – to those who have been sending us tip-offs and researching particular issues, to everyone involved in organising meetings and events, and to the volunteers who are helping us handle parts of the enormous workload that comes from tackling care.data and related issues on multiple fronts.

Please do pass this newsletter on to your friends and family. They can receive future editions by joining our mailing list at http://medconfidential.org/contact/

Phil Booth and Sam Smith
Coordinators, medConfidential
7th November 2014

What is a data usage report?

In short, you should know where your medical records have gone, and why.

Whether you have opted in or out of care.data, there are a whole host of other data flows that relate both to direct care and to all the other things that happen around the NHS. You may have a Summary Care Record (SCR), and your hospital (HES) records may – or may not – be sent to various places depending on your consent where it is applied, and irrespective of your consent where it isn’t.

Some of these data flows are routine; for example, the NHS Business Services Authority sorts out paying prescriptions, so it gets a copy of that data so it can do its statutory job. But if you’re treated in a hospital the various organisations, both private and public, who provide services to that hospital may also get a copy of (some of) your medical record for various reasons.

Why does this matter for you?

If you don’t know where your data has gone, there’s no way to know whether your wishes are being respected. And when there is a problem, there’s no way to know whether you personally were affected.

Most SCR records will not be accessed or viewed when they shouldn’t have been, but without you knowing when your SCR was accessed and by which organisation, you have no way to know whether or not your confidential details have been protected. NHS bodies have that information, and can tell the Health and Social Care Information Centre.

Since the debacle in February, the HSCIC has undertaken a process of significant internal procedural change. In March 2014, it couldn’t say to whom it had sent data that month. By February 2015, it should be possible for HSCIC to tell each individual patient exactly where their medical record went, and why – both for their direct care and for the variety of other uses around the system.

There is, for example, a broad base of support for medical research. The UK wins more than its fair share of Nobel prizes and other measures of esteem, not to mention the development of new treatments to help all. As a patient, your medical records will have been used in a variety of these studies for decades, but until things began to change this summer there has been no way for you – as a patient who contributed – to receive the knowledge of the outcome of these research programmes, even though many years may have passed since your records were used.

HSCIC should remember, and can tell you. Academics and researchers are already required to tell their funders (and hence the public) of the outcomes of their research – in academic papers or other published outputs – so if they tell HSCIC, then HSCIC can tell you about the projects in which your data was involved, however small or large its contribution.

A data usage report (that covers all uses) means you won’t merely have to trust that your data was treated properly by the NHS. You can read your report, and know for yourself.

There are some parts of the health and care system that won’t and shouldn’t ask for NHS numbers, so these will not be included in the report – but if your NHS number is used, then it should be included.

If there are good reasons why something shouldn’t be included in the data usage report, then maybe the NHS number shouldn’t be used. If data can be linked then it likely will be linked at some point, and if this shouldn’t happen then there may be better measures that can be used to prevent linkage, such as not using the NHS number.

Why is a data usage report so important?

Data ‘wants’ to be copied. Without a full commitment to individuals knowing where their data goes – and this must be for everyone, not just those who don’t choose to opt out – there will continue to be mistakes caused by secrecy that are catastrophic to public trust in the handling of NHS patients’ data.

What might a data usage report look like?

In September, medConfidential produced an example of a personalised data usage report [278 kB PDF file] (edit – there’s a 2021 updated example now too). We understand that discussions have moved on and that some of the sections may be slightly different, but this is an active discussion we look forward to seeing happen.

Only with a data usage report, available to every patient, can care.data go forwards. With the emerging details of where patients’ data goes, and on what basis, this cannot be mishandled as so much of the care.data programme has been up to now.


This post was written in 2014 – there is an implementation update for 2015 and 2016, 2019, 2020, and 2021.

The Department of Health: Protecting Personal Health and Care Data?

Despite the name, this consultation has nothing to do with care.data, but has to do with commissioning, care and data, which was allegedly the point of care.data. Yet another example of, when a major problem is confused and fundamentally flawed, those flaws get copied into random other places because of the confusion that assumes that the people running care.data were competent.

Oops.

The DH consultation itself was relatively confusing, and our response was constituted in 5 parts, 2 of which had been published before. We’ve also recently created two supplementary submissions, in response to specific discussions with DH on topics where it wasn’t entirely clear that what academia and we ourselves meant by a term, is what DH considered it to mean. Longitudinal studies form an important part of research, but you can’t just leave some data lying around a safe setting and plead that it’s a longitudinal study.

Special pleading for your medical records

The Nuffield Trust’s submission says: “We strongly support the recognition that appropriately pseudonymised data used for research, service evaluation and other approved purposes are not ‘personal data’ within the meaning of the Data Protection Act.”

It is “recognitions” like that, that led to the debacle of HES being used for purposes that the public disagreed with. We’re not sure that grabbing data at any point and pretending that individual level data is not identifiable is likely to increase public confidence.

Other organisations who don’t gain direct benefit from special pleading, such as the Royal Statistical Society and British Computer Society have made somewhat more balanced submissions.

The BCS submission makes an interesting point, that should any non-public entities to have the ability to become an ASH, or any form of safe setting, BCS would expect them to explicitly agree to the same level of audit that the public sector has: no notice inspections.

Our submission documents, in order for sequential reading:

Letter from medConfidential to all CCGs and Healthwatches

In recent weeks, we have been asking why NHS England has refused to say whether they have written to all CCGs regarding becoming a care.data pathfinder. We still have no answer.

medConfidential has now written to all CCGs (and their corresponding Healthwatch organisations), raising “a number of issues” beyond just care.data, “which may significantly affect patients and healthcare providers within your Clinical Commissioning Group in coming months. Issues raised include:

  • care.data pathfinders
  • Storage of patient objections
  • Respecting patient dissent
  • Coerced ‘consent’

A copy of the letter is available here (footnote listing known research databases now updated, with links).

We look forward to working with CCGs as they consider the questions raised and implications for their CCG and GPs.

[PRESS RELEASE] Partridge Review: Patients need proof to restore confidence

For immediate release – Thursday 19 June 2014

In case you missed it, medConfidential’s initial response to the Partridge review is here: https://medconfidential.org/2014/press-release-patching-hscics-holes-medconfidential-initial-response-to-the-partridge-review/

Detailed analysis of the Partridge Review, published earlier this week [1], reveals a more disturbing picture than has yet been reported. While Sir Nick Partridge’s recommendations are to be welcomed and have been accepted, they have yet to be implemented and – more importantly – evidence must be provided that they are working. Such evidence will be essential to public confidence in the handling of NHS patient data.

The fact is that during a period when ministers and officials have been pushing for a massively increased amount of identifiable patient data to be extracted from the GP records of every man, woman and child in England to the Information Centre under the care.data scheme, serious issues at the Centre itself were either unknown or unresolved.

The largest single data breach in NHS history?

One of the more extraordinary revelations is that in at least two instances – as the list of releases cannot be guaranteed complete – the Information Centre cannot say where it sent patient data. Given that the instance involving the release of HES data was in 2010/11, the year after administration of HES releases was taken in-house, the suggestion that this may have been “an internal Northgate request for data” [6] seems inconsistent with the information provided.

Similarly, no evidence is provided to substantiate the assertion that “no identifiable or potentially identifiable data went missing” [7]. Indeed, the PwC report confirms only that the release in question “was not flagged as containing sensitive or identifiable data”; HES data is commonly provided as pseudonymised patient-level information, i.e. in re-identifiable form [8]. As no information has been provided as to the size of each HES release – which could be a partial extract or a year’s-worth of hospital episodes (tens of millions of dated events) – it is impossible to quantify the number of patients’ records involved.

That “no individual ever complained that their confidentiality had been breached as a result of data being shared or lost by the NHS IC” is beside the point. Up until now no-one knew their data had been lost and it is unlikely that most patients could determine the effects of inappropriate sharing or abuse. In fact there are cases, such as that of Helen Wilkinson [9], which show just how difficult it can be to remove stigmatising errors once propagated by central systems.

It is incorrect to state that no complaints have been made to the Information Commissioner’s Office. medConfidential and others made a complaint regarding the inappropriate and possibly unlawful uploading of 10 years’-worth of HES by PA Consulting (entry 1292 in the spreadsheet of 3,059 releases) to Google’s BigQuery servers [10], and a number of other ‘high profile cases’ are currently under investigation.

Insurers / re-insurers and commercial exploitation

The Secretary of State has repeatedly stated that use of NHS patient data “for commercial insurance or other purely commercial purposes” will be prohibited [11]. While it is to be welcomed that the HSCIC’s Chief Executive has written to three of the re-insurers who hold HES data asking them to delete it, we do not know whether those companies have even replied, much less complied with the request.

Assuming that deletion was part of the contract with the five other insurance companies listed [12], and every other release, it is concerning that the Review does not point to a single instance of an audited deletion of data. Specific mention is made of the suspension of research use, but no such action appears to have been taken in the case of commercial users (or re-users) of NHS patient data, which one can only assume still hold and process data [13].

Systemic failure

It has been claimed that failures were “not systemic”, but the evidence suggests otherwise. The clearest example of this is that when one study within the sample tested – 60 out of 591 MRIS releases – proved not to have the required ONS Legal Gateway approval, investigation of the remaining 90% revealed a further eight instances [2]. Sometimes the Information Centre followed policy and procedure, sometimes it didn’t; that is a systemic failing.

PwC confirms it used a “haphazard sampling” methodology [3] and clearly states there are too many “unknowns” to give “formal assurance or opinion” [4]. Because of failures in record keeping, and in some instances destruction of records, it cannot guarantee the “completeness of the data release list” nor whether the data released “has been used for the intended/stated purpose” [5].

We note that other instances of failure identified within chosen samples did not lead to similar investigations as with MRIS releases, or follow-up action. While we accept that time and resources were limited for this Review, it would be unsafe to conclude anything other than in quite a number of cases – certainly more than are listed in the PwC report, possibly ten times more, given the 10% sample – we simply don’t know what has happened to our data.

Phil Booth, coordinator of medConfidential [14], said:

“We welcome Sir Nick Partridge’s recommendations, but patients need to see the evidence that they’ve been acted on. Public confidence depends on actions, not just words.

“If patients are to trust that procedures and audit are working they must be provided proof of who has their own data, what they are using it for and when it has been deleted. If the systems being constructed for a 21st century NHS cannot provide these answers, they are not fit for purpose.

“Research has been a convenient fig leaf for NHS England when proposing the care.data scheme, but a picture is emerging of commercial companies who get preferential treatment at the head of the queue, while academics patiently languish on waiting lists.”

Notes for editors

1) Partridge Review documents: http://www.hscic.gov.uk/datareview

2) pp36-39, HSCIC Data Release Review PwC Final Report:http://www.hscic.gov.uk/media/14246/HSCIC-Data-Release-Review-PwC-Final-Report/pdf/HSCIC_Data_Release_Review_PwC_Final_Report.pdf

3) p81, HSCIC Data Release Review PwC Final Report: “Haphazard selection, in which the auditor selects the sample without following a structured technique… Haphazard selection is not appropriate when using statistical sampling.” This is not to suggest that such an approach was inappropriate in the time given for the review, more to indicate that conclusions cannot reliably be drawn since it is not a statistically based sampling methodology. Amongst auditors this form of testing is considered of minimal value since there is no assurance findings are representative.

4) p4, HSCIC Data Release Review PwC Final Report: “Given the number of ‘unknowns’ associated with this review due to the time period in question and the availability of historical records/evidence, no formal assurance or opinion have been provided over the findings that may be used by the HSCIC to publish their overall conclusions.”

5) pp4-5, HSCIC Data Release Review PwC Final Report.

6) p7, HSCIC Data Release Review PwC Final Report: “This left 2 data releases where it was not possible to identify the organisation that received the data based on the information retained by the NHS IC. One release related to HES data post April 2009. Further discussion with Northgate has indicated that this could relate to an internal Northgate request for data; however this could not be confirmed.”

7) Paragraph 15, Sir Nick Partridge’s summary of the Review:http://www.hscic.gov.uk/media/14244/Sir-Nick-Partridges-summary-of-the-review/pdf/Sir_Nick_Partridge%27s_summary_of_the_review.pdf

8) For an illustration of the information contained in HES and what can be done with it, see: https://medconfidential.org/2014/commercial-re-use-licences-for-hes-disappearing-webpages/

9) Helen Wilkinson was stigmatised as an alcoholic due to a coding error:http://www.theguardian.com/society/2006/nov/02/health.epublic And as debated in Parliament: http://www.theyworkforyou.com/debates/?id=2005-06-16b.495.0&s=helen+wilkinson#g495.2

10) medConfidential, FIPR & Big Brother Watch complaint re. upload of HES to Google servers: http://medconfidential.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/2014-03-13-ICO-PA-FIPR-complaint.pdf

12) As widely reported in February, e.g. the Guardian on 28/2/14:http://www.theguardian.com/society/2014/feb/28/nhs-data-will-not-be-sold-insurance-companies-jeremy-hunt

11) List of insurers and re-insurers who may still be holding HES and SUS data:

  • 143 Actuarial Profession Critical Illness Working Party – HES, 2011/12;
  • 602 FirstAssist – HES, 2012/13;
  • 603 Foresters Friendly Society – HES, 2007/8;
  • 1293 Pacific Life – HES, 2012/13;
  • 1339-42 RGA UK Services Limited – HES, 2009-2013 (Reinsurance Group of America);
  • 1381 Scottish Re – HES, 2008/9 (re-insurer, headquartered in the Cayman Islands);
  • 1517 Scor Global Life UK – HES, 2012/13 (re-insurer);
  • 2676 Milliman – SUS, 2012/13

13) Many of the websites of the commercial companies listed indicate that they are still offering services based on NHS data, e.g. Beacon Consulting, CHKS, Harvey Walsh, NHiS, etc.

14) medConfidential campaigns for confidentiality and consent in health and social care, seeking to ensure that every flow of data into, across and out of the NHS and care system is consensual, safe and transparent. Founded in January 2013, medConfidential is an independent, non-partisan organisation working with patients and medics, service users and care professionals.

For further information or for immediate or future interview, please contact Phil Booth, coordinator of medConfidential, on 07974 230 839 orphil@medconfidential.org

– ends –

[PRESS RELEASE] HSCIC’s lack of transparency is not so “innocent” after all

For immediate release – Wednesday 3 April 2014

The Health and Social Care Information Centre’s register of data releases, published at noon today, is incomplete and fails to reveal some of the most potentially embarrassing and damaging releases of patient data.

The register does list dozens of commercial companies that have received patient information in various forms over the past year, but fails to list companies known to be holding significant amounts of patient data under ongoing commercial licences.

For example, PA Consulting was awarded a licence for HES data in 2011 which was extended in 2012 to last until November 2015 [1]. The Information Commissioner’s Office is currently investigating a complaint by medConfidential, the Foundation for Information Policy Research (FIPR) and Big Brother Watch on PA Consulting’s uploading of this data to Google’s BigQuery cloud servers [2] so it is inconceivable that HSCIC is not aware the licence remains active.

Another significant omission is the lack of any Police Forces in the register. A Freedom of Information request revealed that Police Forces routinely request data about patients from HSCIC, and that data has been released in dozens of instances within the last year [3].

Phil Booth, coordinator of medConfidential, [4] said:

“Despite saying it has turned a new leaf, HSCIC is deliberately concealing releases of data that might cause itself, or ministers or other officials, embarrassment or political damage. The Information Centre’s lack of transparency is clearly not as “innocent” as its Chair has claimed. [5]

“HSCIC continues in its ridiculous assertion that pseudonymised data is not sensitive or identifiable when tools its customers have built show you can track individuals visit by visit through hospital – and with information published in press reports, social media posts or the date your child was born make it possible to pick out a named individual and read off their entire record. [6]

“Billions of patient records continue to be sold for commercial use without patients’ knowledge or consent, using as justification the very law that minsters have said provides additional safeguards. How long does HSCIC think it can get away with ignoring Jeremy Hunt’s promise to stamp out the commercial exploitation of NHS patients’ information?”

Notes for editors

1) See http://www.hscic.gov.uk/article/3948/Statement-Use-of-data-by-PA-consulting

2) See http://medconfidential.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/2014-03-13-ICO-PA-FIPR- complaint.pdf for medConfidential, FIPR and Big Brother Watch’s complaint to the ICO and http://www.theregister.co.uk/2014/03/04/tripleheaded_nhs_privacy_scare_after_hospital_data_rea ch_marketers_google/ for a description of what happened.

3) The FOI response states: “The Health & Social Care Information Centre (HSCIC) was formed on the 1 April 2013. Since the HSCIC was formed there have been 472 requests received from British Police Forces for information.” A spreadsheet detailing just 180 of these requests shows that 51 releases were made during the period covered by today’s register, all but 3 of which were made under Section 29(3) of the Data Protection Act – not under warrant or Court Order.

4) medConfidential campaigns for confidentiality and consent in health and social care, seeking to ensure that every flow of data into, across and out of the NHS and care system is consensual, safe and transparent. Founded in January 2013, medConfidential is an independent, non-partisan organisation working with patients and medics, service users and care professionals.

care.data opt out forms and letters available here: www.medconfidential.org/how-to-opt-out/

5) “Quite rightly however, the public are suspicious that these arrangements are in some way unfairly tipped in favour of the profit makers. This suspicion has been fuelled by our innocent lack of transparency.” Full text of Kingsley Manning’s speech at HC2014 conferencefile was (re)moved by HSCIC following this press release. This link is to a copy downloaded by medConfidential on 24/3/14.

6) See http://medconfidential.org/2014/commercial-re-use-licences-for-hes-disappearing-webpages/ for a screen grab and explanation of a tool developed by OmegaSolver – one of the companies listed in the register of releases – for use by pharmaceutical marketers.
For further information or for immediate or future interview, please contact Phil Booth, coordinator of medConfidential, on 07974 230 839 or phil@medconfidential.org

– ends –

 

HSCIC Board papers

The Board of the Health and Social Care Information Centre (HSCIC) rather unhelpfully publishes all of its documents within a single zip file, which makes them very hard to google. From November 2014, original documents are available on gov.UK. For your convenience and to assist HSCIC in its drive to become transparent, here is a copy of all of the Board papers, expanded:

June 2015 papers are provided as a published PDF (not zipped)

April 2015

March 2015:

28 January 2015:

27 November 2014

From November 2014 onwards, it seems the interesting material is all in “part 2” of the meeting,  in secret.

3rd September 2014

There was no August 2014 meeting

2 July 2014

4 June 2014

14 May 2014

 

03 April 2014

05 March 2014

 

05 February 2014

15 January 2014

4 December 2013

23 October 2013

September 2013

29 August 2013

19 June 2013

30 May 2013

26 April 2013

3 April 2013