NHS England is still trying to justify in 2015 what it tried to sneak through in 2013. Has it learnt nothing?

• Original Sky News piece and article;
• NHS England briefing;
• PharmaTimes repeats NHS England briefing.

Disclosure: Sam Smith of medConfidential sits on the Privacy Advisory Group for the Office of National Statistics’ (census replacement) Beyond 2011 & Big Data programmes, of which the expert academic at the Oxford Internet Institute interviewed by Sky News is also a member.

Does the database exist?

NHS England: “firstly, there is no database of information for the care.data programme yet”
NHS England: “confirmed that pilot schemes are starting again”
NHS England: “To access the data collected as part of care.data, applicants will need to…”

NHS England itself acknowledges, on a page named “our plans”: “for example, the hospital episode statistics (HES) service has been collating administrative information since the 1980s about every hospital admission funded by the NHS.”

So there are existing databases which are vulnerable to these problems and a new database is being built, it’s just not been built yet. (The ‘new’ specification in 2015 appears to be the same care.data specification from 2013 – with various ‘mistakes’ covering HIV, HPV, and AIDS codes corrected.)

Aspects of the existing data services are as concerning, if not more so, than the care.data proposals.

“A statement and briefing were provided to Sky by NHS England ahead of broadcast”

On Thursday evening, NHS England contacted medConfidential, having seen our tweet, to say they had commented to Sky News. But, as of Monday, the Sky News piece still contained no attributed quote or statement from NHS England. It has a quote from the programme director at HSCIC, not NHS England.

We don’t know the ins and outs of exactly who said what to who when but, yet again, it seems that NHS England is hiding behind another government body – the Health and Social Care Information Centre – to provide justifications that do not speak to the full consequences of its own future proposals.

HSCIC is a “creature of statute”, a body which in law may only do things as Directed, including by NHS England. NHS England is the puppeteer cowering behind the curtain, insisting the puppet’s the one at fault.

“this would be a criminal offence”

While ‘hacking’ into a database of medical information would indeed be a criminal offence, it is rather beside the point. It’s the the ‘Hollywood scenario’ of a remote attacker defeating NHS England’s defences with cunning from their back bedroom, or North Korean data terrorists launching an attack.

What is far more relevant is that copies of the data (HES, etc.) have been sold [1] to a whole range of organisations and companies, many of which continue to receive data. And there are no criminal sanctions for misuse of the data by the recipients or data breaches, which – despite previous denials [2] – we now know there have been [3].

NHS England is quite clear that confidential data is already being sent to places: “confidential data is always encrypted whilst in transmission and the secure networks used to transfer data are regularly tested and monitored for any vulnerabilities”. (Unless David Cameron succeeds in outlawing it, as he proposed last week.)

In the case of the Sky News piece, the researcher acted entirely ethically and correctly in using the information provided by the journalist – who had given full and informed consent, and was clearly aware of the risks. Those who would rather continue the status quo and placate, rather than inform, the public are less likely to explain all of the risks and mitigations to a journalist. And highly selective ‘explanations’ do not give the full picture.

Given the continuing distribution of 25 years of hospital records – over 1 billion dated events – this research identifies both the grave risk to the medical privacy of the country, and the continued wilful ignorance of NHS England.

1) On a “cost recovery” basis.
2) On BBC Radio 4’s Today programme, 4 February 2014, Tim Kelsey claimed “in 25 years there has never been a single episode in which the rules… have ever compromised a patient’s privacy.”
3) HSCIC’s FOI response on 7 April 2014 lists a data breach in every year from 2009 to 2012; HSCIC holds no records from before it was formed in 2005.

Where does the data go?

NHS England: “To access the data collected as part of care.data, applicants will need to go through an approvals process and then, during the pathfinder stage, can only see it in a secure data facility (SDF). During pathfinder stage, access applications will only be accepted from select organisations and there is a robust security procedure in place when the applicant visits the SDF.” [our emphasis]

The crucial point being, what about after the pathfinder stage? Where will applicants be able to “see” the data then?

Will NHS England revert to current practice, as for HES and other data, and permit copies of the data to be sent out? There’s little point constructing a “secure data facility” if it is not then used for all future access to the data.

If all NHS England will promise is to keep patients’ data in the SDF “during the pathfinder stage” then it is just a temporary safeguard, which can be removed for the full national roll-out.

So why won’t NHS England promise that patients’ data will always be kept in the secure data facility? It clearly wants to keep its options open – but if the intention is for data to be accessed in other ways in future, why aren’t patients and GPs being told? Given NHS England’s track record of miscommunication, trumpeting what actually amounts to a tightly time-limited conditional safeguard does very little to inspire confidence.

“NHS to carry on selling patient records to insurers” – Telegraph, 27 November 2014

NHS England: “credit rating agencies or health insurers would not be granted access to the NHS’ secure data facility where the information will be held.”

This may sound pretty definite, but can NHS England cite the precise part of legislation which provides the same level of certainty as that statement? We doubt it, because it has never previously been able to do so. NHS England argues the claim on the Telegraph front page was false, but has never provided any evidence to support its assertions. And we’ve asked, repeatedly.

In fact, the law remains mute on the types of companies that may have access to the data – it concentrates on uses – and the undefined phrase “for the promotion of health” leaves open loopholes for data access that even McDonalds or Big Tobacco might use. (Regulations that might begin to address this, for the Care Act passed in May, are still unpublished.)

Misunderstanding the ‘birthday attack’

PharmaTimes: “NHS England said the suggestion by Sky is incorrect, saying the likelihood of being able to identify an individual “is negligible”

NHS England is again misleading the public.

As an analogy, if you consider a classroom and pick two children at random it is highly unlikely – 1 in 133,225 (i.e. 365 x 365) – that they will both have a specific birthday. But if you walk into that same classroom of 23 children or more and ask “Do two of you share a birthday?” then the chances are better than 50-50 that the answer is yes.

Example 1: Know someone who had a heart attack?

Presume someone you know has had a heart attack.

NHS England has 181 A&E departments [4] handling England’s 386 heart attacks per day [5], so each A&E receives, on average, 2 heart attack victims per day. Which, even without any other information, gives a 50% probability of spontaneous identification of a victim whose hospital and date of event is known (neither should be sensitive on their own). As the OII research into the Sky News journalist argued, that is information that gets tweeted, as it is ‘not sensitive’.

Because the data is linked over time – ‘longitudinal’, to use the proper statistical term – discovery of a single medical event would mean you can use that pseudonym to link back to all of that person’s other medical events, because “the pseudonym is allocated to the record instead” (NHS England).

It doesn’t matter what the pseudonym is or what form it takes, what matters is that it links the records. The information associated with the date of the event is what gives you the link to a victim, not the NHS number or pseudonym.

NHS England is therefore being disingenuous when it says “once a patient’s record has been matched, the information that could identify a patient is removed and the pseudonym is allocated to the record instead” and that pseudonyms can be converted back to the original identifier “only by using the specific encryption key that created the pseudonym” and this is “only ever disclosed in very exceptional circumstances”.

Of course NHS England does not disclose the original identifier (NHS number). The key point that the researcher made, and that NHS England missed or continues to wilfully ignore, is that this is completely irrelevant.

And it shows that NHS England has learnt nothing from the concerns of the last year.

In February 2014, David Davis MP argued that knowing the dates he had his nose broken (due to media attention) would mean his entire medical record could be identified. NHS England has never refuted this argument with substance.

4) DH count. See https://www.whatdotheyknow.com/request/131933/response/325271/attach/3/Annex%20A%20Final.pdf 
5) 141,000 per year in England: https://www.bhf.org.uk/publications/statistics/cardiovascular-disease-statistics-2014

Example 2: Women with children

NHS England seems to believe that your children’s birthdays are secret.

For example, by the HSCIC’s own rules, in HES the date and code for “Birth date – baby” is deemed identifiable, but the date and code for “maternity: where the baby was delivered” is not [6]. These are the same event, stored twice, but treated as if they are entirely different. Removing only one of them does not magically turn HES into non-personal data, and HES contains dozens – if not hundreds – of such fields.

Similarly, a family is identifiable by knowing the birthdays of the children. For a family of 2 children, there is a 90% likelihood that the birthdays of the two children are unique. For a family with 3 children, the children’s birth dates are almost certainly a unique identifier for that family in the country, tracked via the mother’s medical history.

On average, one set of twins are born in each maternity hospital in the UK per day. There are just 208 triplets born in the UK per year, i.e. fewer than one per day. If you know the birthdate of a triplet you could therefore read off the entire medical history of the mother via that single event.

6) For a single illustrative example, see HSCIC HES inpatient data dictionary, page 11, field: admimeth (and many, many others). This is only one method of delivery, others are equivalent.

Example 3: Who gets chemotherapy?

NHS England repeatedly argues that its care.data programme is necessary because “the NHS isn’t capable, currently, of telling you how many patients are undergoing chemotherapy, for example”.

In fact, the vast majority of chemotherapy is delivered in secondary, not primary care. Extracting data from GPs’ systems would provide no more information than is (or should already be) gathered from the actual providers. If you want to know who is receiving treatment, the most sensible choice is to go to the source of the treatment.

And to count the number of people, it is simply not necessary to know who they are – a count of unique identifiers is enough. NHS England is mandating the use of NHS numbers by care providers, and that mandate is in the process of being passed into law.

To count people, you need to know only that you’re counting non-duplicate entities. It does not matter whether you use names, physical people or their pseudonyms (e.g. telephone number, NHS number, or an arbitrary pseudonym).

Worked example 4:  Don’t get into an accident

Relatively minor medical events of those in the public domain are often reported – how many women of a particular age reported to a particular hospital with an elbow injury, for example, the day that Nick Clegg’s wife broke her elbow in 2010, just before the general election? [7] – and even the most private of individuals can find themselves in the newspaper due to an accident.

Standard journalistic practice means that accidents reported in the local press will include the date of the event, a person’s name and age, along with the area of town – in some cases even the road – where the victim lives. Such reports usually provide enough information for an informed guess at likely diagnoses, which can then be matched with a particular incident. (With regard to example 2, the same would be true of someone announcing the birth of their triplets on Twitter or Facebook.)

An experiment by Professor Latanya Sweeney of the Harvard Data Laboratory starkly demonstrates the risks of matching within ‘de-identified’ data, i.e. data where some identifiers have been removed, rather than being replaced by pseudonyms.

Taking the US equivalent of HES – de-identified public hospital records for a state – and using articles in local news reports giving an indication of types of injury, her team was able to confirm that merely by being involved in an incident where you were taken to hospital, it was routinely possible to match to the victim’s entire hospital history, and discover details that even the patient had not told the hospital directly, but which had been discovered from their medical profile.

When contacted by the project, patients were horrified to find they could be identified and have their medical history exposed from the data made available.

7) https://www.google.com/search?q=nick+clegg+wife+election+elbow+broken

Pseudonyms

Identification isn’t just about finding someone’s name; it’s about linking an individual’s data records together so that you can learn things about them. If I know your home address, gender, date of birth, hair colour, eye colour, weight and telephone number, it doesn’t matter how many characters are in your database’s pseudonym – what matters is that I, and my data, can be (re)identified.

NHS England’s argument is bureaucratic obfuscation. It’s like saying that having a phone number doesn’t tell you who someone is and then blaming the patient for answering the phone with their name.

Or in another analogy, it’s the sort of approach that insists you have to know the name of the bug that bit you in order for it to matter. We don’t have many small poisonous bugs in England, but other places do. Small creatures have many names; they have their Latin classification, they have names in English, and in local areas they have names in local languages, etc. In short, they have many pseudonyms – but it’s all the same bug.

If you’re bitten by a poisonous bug, the sensible medical approach doesn’t care about its actual name but rather, by asking questions about its attributes – what colour was it? was it spotty or stripy? how many legs? any wings? – the care provider can work out the appropriate treatment. The name really doesn’t matter; what you care about is the antidote, a name you will care about far, far more! At best, whatever the bug is called may be a link between looking it up and how you cure the bite – but you really don’t need the name.

Attempting to make this all about pseudonyms seriously misses the point. The real problem is the linked individual-level data that the NHS has treated so egregiously badly in the past, which with this argument NHS England appears to continue to want to do.

In 1989 this was all new, and difficult. In 2015, there are no excuses.

In summary

NHS England’s scenario: “In the extremely unlikely event an individual was able to ‘hack’ the system, they would need the encryption key to convert back the coding” is a diversion.

The point is not that one can infer an individual’s identity from the linking pseudonym – taking the “100 character” pseudonym to “convert back the coding” – it’s that there is so much other data in the file that you don’t have to.

As detailed above, in the ‘Hollywood Scenario’ the chances of someone arbitrarily picking a row in a dataset and knowing who it is are slim. But, as PharmaTimes suggests, that’s the imaginary plotline for a movie, not real world protection of patients.

Can NHS England tell the difference? We suggest they listen to the experts who can.

For the rich, dated linked data about which NHS England has given no assurances regarding dissemination beyond the ‘pathfinder’ stage of care.data and using widely-available other information, as the researcher at OII and our by no means exhaustive examples show, there are many ways to identify people’s medical records in individual-level data – regardless of whether it has been pseudonymised (or de-identified).

That NHS England continues to try to mislead the public on this fundamental point in 2015 suggests the “pause” it took to “listen and understand” public concerns throughout 2014 was not enough. Continuing to hold onto and propagate the fantasy that pseudonymisation makes the possibility of re-identification “negligible” is either naïve or incompetent.

We’re not quite sure what’s worse.

IIGOP Annual Report

Following its care.data report at the end of last year, the 2014 Annual Report of Dame Fiona Caldicott’s Independent Information Governance Oversight Panel (IIGOP) was published in early January. Amongst other things, it says:

In summary, the goal should be a state of information governance in which the following proposition prevails: “Organisations have no hiding places, the public have no surprises.”

But with good progress having been made on just six of the year-long Caldicott2 Review’s 26 recommendations, the IIGOP is forced to conclude:

Unfortunately the cultural change that we called for [in 2013] in relation to information governance has only emerged in parts of the system.

The annual report goes into some detail on care.data in Chapter 3, noting:

The unintended consequence of care.data was a positive cycle of change, with greater public interest causing organisations to respond with greater transparency and stronger information governance.

But, worryingly, on consent across the health and care system:

IIGOP welcomes the Secretary of State’s enhancement of the “right to object” in the care.data programme, but calls for a more consistent approach. It is not reasonable to expect the public to understand objections and “opt outs” if there are different rules for different programmes. This remains unfinished business.

Over the next few weeks, we will see whether the Government and NHS England are moving towards that goal – or whether they’ve been hiding more surprises for the public later in the year.

Meanwhile, Healthwatch England “found disturbing evidence of the harm caused by failure to share information appropriately. The inquiry focused on the experiences of older people, people with mental health conditions and people who are homeless.”

The findings, summarised on pages 17 and 18 of the annual report, are especially horrifying due to the impacts on the direct care of patients – a missed opportunity cost due to the care.data programme:

Public opinion research has shown that most patients want any healthcare professional who treats them to have secure electronic access to key data from their GP health record. Most were surprised that emergency care doctors do not have automatic access to records, and concerned that lack of access may lead to delays in treatment and fatal errors. The public’s main concerns about the use of information about them were suspicions around usage creep, lack of personal benefits and loss of data.

As medConfidential has always said, there need be no conflict between good ethics, good data handling and good medical care.
A Statutory Data Guardian?

We had hoped that, as the Secretary of State said would happen, the National Data Guardian – providing independent, overarching information oversight for the entire health and care system – would be put on a statutory footing “at the earliest opportunity”. That opportunity was last Friday, but the Secretary of State failed to meet his commitment.

As we now discover from the IIGOP’s Annual Report, this is just one example of what happened without a strong oversight body:

NHS England communicated the proposal in a leaflet that was supposed to be delivered to all homes across England in January 2014. A copy of the intended leaflet was sent to IIGOP shortly before the quarterly meeting of the panel on 9th December 2013. On the following day IIGOP advised NHS England that its leaflet was not fit for purpose, but was informed that it had already been sent to the printers and would not be recalled.

Last Friday, Jeremy Lefroy’s Private Member’s Bill reached its final stage in the House of Commons, and has now moved on to the Lords. When the NHS Number is used beyond the NHS, its wider use a lifelong identifier for every person in the UK will also never be recalled. We wrote a briefing on this issue when it first raised its head.

Anniversary

2015 marks 10 years since the dodgy deal between the (then) NHS Information Centre and Dr Foster Ltd – a period during which, as we now know, less-than-optimal decisions were made.

One quote in the Public Accounts Committee’s report that sounds entirely familiar from the care.data fiasco a decade on:

At the outset there was an urgency to complete the deal with Dr Foster Ltd, and in negotiating the joint venture the roles and responsibilities of the Department’s advisors were sometimes confused.

With echoes of the messy “IG Universe” picture that emerged last year, and with venture capitalists that now own bits of the private sector part of Dr Foster Ltd writing down their stake and seeking an exit, we see once again that – in the long term – routing round or failing to institute and apply proper Information Governance doesn’t help anyone.

Finally, as the 12 month mark approaches, we understand the Health Select Committee will continue its inquiry into care.data and the handling of NHS patients’ records shortly. Let’s hope that this time its members will be given full and frank evidence by all.

Ahead of Tuesday afternoon’s Commons Health Select Committee session with Jeremy Hunt, we’ve published a briefing with some current questions for the Secretary of State for Health. Hopefully the Committee will get chance to ask one of them.

As a result of the care.data Advisory Group public meeting in Manchester and recent press coverage, we have also written directly to both the Secretary of State and NHS England Chief Executive, Simon Stevens, about matters of increasing concern in NHS England’s approach to care.data. We look forward to public statements on the substantive issues we have raised, certainly before any ‘pathfinder’ is to proceed.

Last Friday, 5 December, HSCIC held another event as part of their post-Partridge Review process. The Information Centre has made a number of positive changes since the Partridge Review, and we hope this approach continues into the future. Unfortunately, HSCIC is often hampered by the decisions – or lack thereof – of NHS England, which has clearly not gone through the same level of reflection and renewal on consent and data issues since the care.data debacle earlier this year.

It remains to be seen if the Department of Health itself wishes to be more like HSCIC than NHS England. With the Secretary of State’s commitment that the role of National Data Guardian will be made a statutory body “at the earliest opportunity” and an amendment to Jeremy Lefroy’s Private Members’ Bill to do just that, the opportunity is there (see our Bill Committee briefing). Given weasel words that have been used before, it is actions that are required from the Secretary of State to deliver on his promising words.

We have also proposed a second clarification amendment to Jeremy Lefroy’s Bill – for a transparent register of every body authorised to make use of the NHS number – which we hope to see adopted at Committee Stage in the Commons, followed by Third Reading and all of the stages in the Lords before the election. And we note even a draft of the Regulations to define “the promotion of health”, sanctions for misuse and the rules and operation of the Confidentiality Advisory Group have yet to be published. There is a long way to go.

Speaking of a long way to go, we have still heard very little about the Department of Health’s proposed changes around “Accredited Safe Havens”. From what we do hear, we are increasingly concerned that they may allow data to be reused in “misguided, but well-meaning” ways, by entities that would cause significant concern were they to access data they might be a little too eager to get.

This week is the first Leadership Meeting of the Department of Health’s National Information Board (NIB) since the lay members were appointed. The event will be broadcast live on Tuesday morning. While usually paid to be one half of medConfidential, Sam Smith has been appointed by the Department of Health as a lay member – “like a non-executive director” – solely in a personal capacity, and sits on the Board on that basis.

It’s Christmas…

We deeply appreciate every donation you give us and especially the messages you include with them, whatever the amount… £5, £50 or more. We know each donation is an expression of individual support for what we are doing and the good wishes that come along with that.

medConfidential is a tiny organisation, hitting well above its weight, but to keep going we have to find around £60k per year. If you are – or know – someone who could make a substantial contribution towards our operating costs, please get in touch – coordinator@medconfidential.org .

Seasons Greetings to all – there’ll be one more update before the end of the year.

What just happened?

The MP for Stafford, Jeremy Lefroy, has introduced a Private Members’ Bill that would amongst other things mandate the use of NHS numbers as “consistent identifiers” across health and social care.

We have some concerns about potential unintended consequences of the proposed legislation but believe these can be addressed at the upcoming Committee stage, to which the Bill was sent this morning. We’ll be starting to engage with specific MPs on the Committee from next week.

What is in care.data?

As NHS England begins to ramp up again towards the ‘pathfinder’ stage (see our last newsletter) the new narrative seems to be that the data to be extracted from your GP record is only “codes”. Quite aside from the fact that each item will be associated with your NHS number, date of birth, full postcode, gender and ethnicity, these codes are not secret – they are published, and even used in adverts on the sides of trains.

To help you understand the breadth of the information to be extracted under the current version of care.data, we have put together an online tool to let you search and read the diagnoses, treatments and other ‘events’ described by the codes. All the events within the care.data GP dataset will have dates attached and be linked to every other medical diagnosis you have on the dataset, or that can be inferred from your prescriptions.

Click on the link below to search or browse the information that will be extracted from your GP record under care.data:

• codeList tool

N.B. The page may initially take a minute or so to load as it contains a significant amount of information.

Where does your data go, and why?

You should know where your medical records have gone, and why (longer version).

Whether you have opted in or out of care.data, there are a whole host of other data flows that relate both to direct care and to all the other things that happen around the NHS. You may have a Summary Care Record (SCR), and your hospital (HES) records may – or may not – be sent to various places depending on your consent where it is applied, and irrespective of your consent where it isn’t.

If you don’t know where your data has gone, there’s no way to know whether your wishes are being respected. And when there is a problem, there’s no way to know whether you personally were affected. In September, we produced an example of such a personalised data usage report [PDF] that we believe should be available to every patient.

Without a full commitment to individuals knowing where their data goes – and this must be for everyone, not just those who don’t choose to opt out – there will continue to be mistakes caused by secrecy that would be catastrophic to public trust in the handling of NHS patients’ data.

More details on data usage reports.

What next?

Though the care.data ‘pathfinder’ areas have been announced – Leeds (3 CCGs: West / North / South and East), Blackburn with Darwen CCG, West Hampshire CCG and Somerset CCG – we still don’t know which practices will be participating, and are waiting to see exactly what patients and GPs will be told.

With new Regulations and Directions still to be published, including clarification on the definition of “promotion of health” and sanctions for misuse, and with issues such as commercial re-use and access to patient data after the pathfinder stage still to be resolved, a number of crucial concerns must be addressed before the scheme moves forward.

We shall, of course, keep you updated as more information becomes available.

Meanwhile, the next Open Meeting of the care.data Advisory Group, on which medConfidential sits, will be held in central Manchester on 26 November. This will be the third in a series of public events where patients have the chance to ask questions about care.data and hear directly from NHS England. For more details or to register to attend, please visit the Open Meeting webpage.

And finally

Thank you for all your support – to those who have been sending us tip-offs and researching particular issues, to everyone involved in organising meetings and events, and to the volunteers who are helping us handle parts of the enormous workload that comes from tackling care.data and related issues on multiple fronts.

Please do pass this newsletter on to your friends and family. They can receive future editions by joining our mailing list at http://medconfidential.org/contact/

Phil Booth and Sam Smith
Coordinators, medConfidential
7th November 2014

In short, you should know where your medical records have gone, and why.

Whether you have opted in or out of care.data, there are a whole host of other data flows that relate both to direct care and to all the other things that happen around the NHS. You may have a Summary Care Record (SCR), and your hospital (HES) records may – or may not – be sent to various places depending on your consent where it is applied, and irrespective of your consent where it isn’t.

Some of these data flows are routine; for example, the NHS Business Services Authority sorts out paying prescriptions, so it gets a copy of that data so it can do its statutory job. But if you’re treated in a hospital the various organisations, both private and public, who provide services to that hospital may also get a copy of (some of) your medical record for various reasons.

Why does this matter for you?

If you don’t know where your data has gone, there’s no way to know whether your wishes are being respected. And when there is a problem, there’s no way to know whether you personally were affected.

Most SCR records will not be accessed or viewed when they shouldn’t have been, but without you knowing when your SCR was accessed and by which organisation, you have no way to know whether or not your confidential details have been protected. NHS bodies have that information, and can tell the Health and Social Care Information Centre.

Since the debacle in February, the HSCIC has undertaken a process of significant internal procedural change. In March 2014, it couldn’t say to whom it had sent data that month. By February 2015, it should be possible for HSCIC to tell each individual patient exactly where their medical record went, and why – both for their direct care and for the variety of other uses around the system.

There is, for example, a broad base of support for medical research. The UK wins more than its fair share of Nobel prizes and other measures of esteem, not to mention the development of new treatments to help all. As a patient, your medical records will have been used in a variety of these studies for decades, but until things began to change this summer there has been no way for you – as a patient who contributed – to receive the knowledge of the outcome of these research programmes, even though many years may have passed since your records were used.

HSCIC should remember, and can tell you. Academics and researchers are already required to tell their funders (and hence the public) of the outcomes of their research – in academic papers or other published outputs – so if they tell HSCIC, then HSCIC can tell you about the projects in which your data was involved, however small or large its contribution.

A data usage report (that covers all uses) means you won’t merely have to trust that your data was treated properly by the NHS. You can read your report, and know for yourself.

There are some parts of the health and care system that won’t and shouldn’t ask for NHS numbers, so these will not be included in the report – but if your NHS number is used, then it should be included.

If there are good reasons why something shouldn’t be included in the data usage report, then maybe the NHS number shouldn’t be used. If data can be linked then it likely will be linked at some point, and if this shouldn’t happen then there may be better measures that can be used to prevent linkage, such as not using the NHS number.

Why is a data usage report so important?

Data ‘wants’ to be copied. Without a full commitment to individuals knowing where their data goes – and this must be for everyone, not just those who don’t choose to opt out – there will continue to be mistakes caused by secrecy that are catastrophic to public trust in the handling of NHS patients’ data.

What might a data usage report look like?

In September, medConfidential produced an example of a personalised data usage report [278 kB PDF file] (edit – there’s a 2021 updated example now too). We understand that discussions have moved on and that some of the sections may be slightly different, but this is an active discussion we look forward to seeing happen.

Only with a data usage report, available to every patient, can care.data go forwards. With the emerging details of where patients’ data goes, and on what basis, this cannot be mishandled as so much of the care.data programme has been up to now.

This post was written in 2014 – there is an implementation update for 2015 and 2016, 2019, 2020, and 2021.

Despite the name, this consultation has nothing to do with care.data, but has to do with commissioning, care and data, which was allegedly the point of care.data. Yet another example of, when a major problem is confused and fundamentally flawed, those flaws get copied into random other places because of the confusion that assumes that the people running care.data were competent.

Oops.

The DH consultation itself was relatively confusing, and our response was constituted in 5 parts, 2 of which had been published before. We’ve also recently created two supplementary submissions, in response to specific discussions with DH on topics where it wasn’t entirely clear that what academia and we ourselves meant by a term, is what DH considered it to mean. Longitudinal studies form an important part of research, but you can’t just leave some data lying around a safe setting and plead that it’s a longitudinal study.

Special pleading for your medical records

The Nuffield Trust’s submission says: “We strongly support the recognition that appropriately pseudonymised data used for research, service evaluation and other approved purposes are not ‘personal data’ within the meaning of the Data Protection Act.”

It is “recognitions” like that, that led to the debacle of HES being used for purposes that the public disagreed with. We’re not sure that grabbing data at any point and pretending that individual level data is not identifiable is likely to increase public confidence.

Other organisations who don’t gain direct benefit from special pleading, such as the Royal Statistical Society and British Computer Society have made somewhat more balanced submissions.

The BCS submission makes an interesting point, that should any non-public entities to have the ability to become an ASH, or any form of safe setting, BCS would expect them to explicitly agree to the same level of audit that the public sector has: no notice inspections.

Our submission documents, in order for sequential reading:

• Overview
• A substantive proposal for safe settings
• Implementing a safe setting (HRRDL) – ASH version
• Getting to safe settings from the status quo
• Response to the consultation
• Supplementary 1 – Longitudinal Studies
• Supplementary 2 – The Farr Institutes

In recent weeks, we have been asking why NHS England has refused to say whether they have written to all CCGs regarding becoming a care.data pathfinder. We still have no answer.

medConfidential has now written to all CCGs (and their corresponding Healthwatch organisations), raising “a number of issues” beyond just care.data, “which may significantly affect patients and healthcare providers within your Clinical Commissioning Group in coming months. Issues raised include:

• care.data pathfinders
• Storage of patient objections
• Respecting patient dissent
• Coerced ‘consent’

A copy of the letter is available here (footnote listing known research databases now updated, with links).

We look forward to working with CCGs as they consider the questions raised and implications for their CCG and GPs.