Category Archives: News

2016 Digital Economy Bill

On the day that Tory MPs vote on a new leader, with the Home Secretary who tore up an ID card on her first day in office in the lead, the Government has introduced legislation to bring the database state back via the side door.

s38 of the Digital Economy Bill may require sharing of births, marriages, and deaths across the public sector in bulk without individual consent.

s29 as written allows sharing of medical information to anywhere in the public sector, or commercial companies providing public services, if it may increase “contribution to society”.

The National Data Guardian is not placed on a statutory footing.

As the Conservative leadership election moves forward, it seems to be that the database state is back.

 


 

update: The Cabinet Office have been in touch to say:

Para 18 of the government response clearly states:
18.       The Government acknowledges the importance of health and social care data in multi-agency preventative approaches and early intervention to prevent harm. We will do further work with the National Data Guardian following the publication of her review/report to consider how health data is best shared in line with her recommendations.

As a result health bodies are out of scope of the powers in the draft regulations.

The Bill itself contains no such exclusion, and many local authorities have been lobbying for precisely that access. We will look to clarify with a probing amendment at committee stage, but appreciate the press office getting in touch.

medConfidential – mid June update

We’ll have more on implementation of the hospital data opt-outs when the dust has settled after the referendum.

“Intelligent Transparency”

According to a letter from a Minister, “Intelligent Transparency” is the new goal. We hope that all Department of Health decisions will prove “intelligent” from a patient view, and not just the political priorities of their desk in Whitehall.

Will transparency extend to telling you how your data has been used?  Or is that the sort of intelligence they don’t want you to have?

Tech startups are no magic bullet

We’re waiting for a response from the Regulators about DeepMind’s project at the Royal Free Hospital Trust. Whatever they say, we note that Google has now made public commitments to move towards the transparency expected of them. Regulators are still investigating, and given the contradictory statements, it may take some time.

We look forward to seeing what they will tell the public about their experiments to replace doctors.

What can you do: The Hospital Episode Statistics consultation

The Hospital Episode Statistics cover data from the nation’s hospitals for over 25 years. The HSCIC is looking for everyone’s views on privacy in the data. We’ll have a long response in a few weeks, but you can quickly complete their survey (or just email enquiries@hscic.gov.uk with a subject of “HES PIA consultation”). You don’t need to answer all the questions – you can just say why it matters to you that your privacy and opt out applies to hospital data. 

Investigatory Powers Bill – Protections for Medical Records?

We welcome Home Office Minister John Hayes’ statements that additional protections for medical records will be added to the Investigatory Powers Bill.

He said: “I am prepared in this specific instance to confirm that the security and intelligence agencies do not hold a bulk personal dataset of medical records. Furthermore, I cannot currently conceive of a situation where, for example, obtaining all NHS records would be either necessary or proportionate.”

Additionally, because he “felt that it was right in the national interest, with the benefit of the wisdom of the Committee” … “I feel that the public expect us to go further” than currently on the face of the bill, because he “cannot bind those who hold office in the future, so it is important that we put additional protections in place.”

Having agreed in principle that there should be “additional protections”, there are multiple ways to implement them.

For these purposes, it is sufficient to consider that Bulk Personal Datasets are used where the identities of the individuals being targeted are unknown, and you need to search by attributes across whole databases rather than names. Think of it like searching your phone book by phone number, rather than by name.

 

Existing mechanisms to get this information

As a Home Office Minister speaking in Committee, there is no reason he would be aware of the existing gateways available for doing precisely the things he was thinking about needing to be able to do in rare circumstances, for the exceptional reasons he was thinking they may need to be done.

In the course of an investigation, especially in a terrorism incident, the police can ask the NHS questions. The police or agencies won’t be able to go fishing for answers, they can ask the relevant hospitals questions, and the hospitals can take a view on whether it is appropriate to answer based on full details. There can be a process followed which can command public confidence.

Doctors are permitted to override the common law duty of confidentiality and release such information to the police when they “believe that it is in the wider public interest,” under GMC guidance. After a terrorism event, it is inconceivable they would not do so. When investigators know what to ask for, they have the ability to use existing processes for those individuals’ details on a targeted basis, should they be relevant.

There is existing guidance on this, and if it needs to be updated, that does not prevent stronger protections on bulk access to medical records being added to the the Bill.

Even if there is only a “risk” that those individuals may have been involved, or may be involved in terrorism in future, the duty of confidence for providing information to the Agencies was lifted in part 5 of the 2015 Counter Terrorism and Security Act.

The Home Office has lowered the bar of confidentiality protection dramatically over the last several years. Unamended, these powers remove it entirely.

 

What the protection must cover

The committee rightly identified that there must be protections for “for material relating to “patient information” as defined in section 251(10) of the National Health Service Act 2006, or relating to “mental health”, “adult social care”, “child social care”, or “health services””. All sections of that are important, although there are different ways to put them together.

It is insufficient to simply exempt data held by DH/NHS data controllers, as that does not cover social care, nor does it cover data with data processors contracted to the NHS (which is a different loophole of concern to the ICO).

The Agencies should also never be permitted to use covert means against the NHS or health professionals to acquire patient information.

Should the Agencies create a scenario where there has been a secret incident where medical professionals are not allowed to know the characteristics of a suspect, and that search can only be done at some future point by the Agencies, rather than now by the medical staff, then some mechanism may be appropriate. This seems highly unlikely, but the Home Office may be able to make such a case to the satisfaction of both Houses of Parliament. We invite them to do so.

In that scenario, it is likely to be necessary to have multiple levels of protection. A general ban on warrantry for such data, except where the data responsible Secretary of State has submitted to the Judicial Commissioner an approval for its handover and retention for a defined period for a defined investigation, and no others.

In effect, this removes from the Agencies permission to acquire the data, but retaining the ability for the Secretary of State elsewhere in Government to hand it over should they believe it appropriate. The Commissioner and Intelligence Services Committee should then be required to be notified that this has been approved, and state on how many individual level records were affected in any annual report covering the period.

Whatever the Home Office come up with, it must be robust and be seen to be robust. We remain happy to discuss this further with all parties.

Update on Google Deepmind’s NHS app – is it “just resting” ?

It appears Google Deepmind has suspended use/“pilots” of their experimental app until they have received regulatory clarification – ie, until it is legal.

This whole incident was harmful to patient trust, it was harmful to the hospital, and it was harmful to Google. All because, it appears, there was a desire to go faster than waiting a few weeks for regulatory and data approvals, and so used a bizarre cut’n’shut agreement.

The controversy has never been about whether the app would help clinicians with their patients. It has been entirely about what happened for people who were not patients of those clinicians. Some of questions from over a week ago remain unanswered. “Collect it all” might have applied to version 1 of the app, but they now have first hand experience of how it makes things harder not easier.

Tech teams often like naming their work. Perhaps the next version will be “Streams 2: This time we read the regulations”…

Google Deepmind could have followed the rules about applications for direct care, and the usage of data for “development work” (ie, “secondary uses”). They just didn’t, for some reason that we will ask their independent reviewers to get to the bottom of.

The app deserves to come back safely, if the humans running the project can follow the rules to get the data and processes that they wish to bring to the NHS. Nothing in our understanding of what they were doing, and the existing rules, should have prevented from doing this “pilot” (apparently), entirely legally, with conventional legal agreements. They simply didn’t do so.

If Google Deepmind choose to walk away from the project, it won’t be because they wanted to help the NHS; it’ll be because they wanted to help only on their terms. For the hospital, and the NHS more widely, it is yet another reminder that some offers of help may come with too high a price.
where-google-app-went-wrong

MedConfidential comment on Friday’s New Scientist revelations about Google Deepmind

 

Extraordinarily, the New Scientist has quoted Google as having used as part of an unregulated algorithm in the direct care of patients[1].

This follows up on previous news that Google Deepmind had acquired millions of detailed patient histories for unclear purposes[2]. Google Deepmind’s response was to focus that they were keeping the data safely[3], and to ignore questions over what they were doing with it, and whether they should have had it in the first place[4].

MedConfidential has long argued that every patient should be able to know how data about them has been used. If there had been a Ministerial commitment to do that, this mess of unanswered questions would not have happened.[5]

Announced yesterday, it is Government policy to “encourage and support data-driven techniques in policy and service delivery”. Innovation is welcome and vital, but it should be grounded in medical ethics and a clinical relationship, and not ride roughshod over processes in place to protect all involved.[6]

Responding to the latest information, MedConfidential coordinator Phil Booth said:

“Deepmind has spent a fortnight hiding behind the NHS. It’s now clear that this was a unregulated “development” project for deepmind, but a patient care project for the NHS.

“These algorithms evolve: errors get fixed, improvements get made. What approvals did Deepmind have from the medical regulators at the early stages? As the provider of a tool used in direct care, they are responsible for ensuring it meets all safety standards.

“Training doctors to make safe decisions takes years, and requires many exams to be passed. Have Google shown that each version used in direct care met all relevant grades, standards, and regulations?

-ends-

For immediate or future interview, please email coordinator@medconfidential.org 

Notes to editors:

 

  1. See https://www.newscientist.com/article/2088056-exclusive-googles-nhs-deal- does-not-have-regulatory-approval/  “We [Deepmind] and our partners at the Royal Free are in touch with MHRA regarding our development work.”

 

  1. See https://www.newscientist.com/article/2086454-revealed-google-ai-has-access- to-huge-haul-of-nhs-patient-data/ and http://techcrunch.com/2016/05/04/concerns- raised-over-broad-scope-of-deepmind-nhs-health-data-sharing-deal/

 

  1. Google’s self-defence https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/ may/06/deepmind-best-privacy-infrastructure-handling-nhs-data-says-co-founder refers to their self-reported scores in the IG Toolkit https://www.igt.hscic.gov.uk/AssessmentReportCriteria.aspx?tk=424999242358961&lnv=3&cb=e8c1aaf1-c40d-45af-9bb9-adc46c712924&sViewOrgId=49979&sDesc=8JE14 . Those scores have not yet been audited by the HSCIC.

 

  1. The question of why Google Deepmind had the histories of people who never had a blood test at the relevant hospital, and who may never return to the hospital, remains unanswered.

 

  1. Much like a bank statement, every patient should be able to see a data usage report, which tells them where data about them has been used, and why, and what the benefits of that usage were. A commitment to investigate implementation was made in late 2014, but remains delayed by the Caldicott Review of Consent. For more, see https://medconfidential.org/2014/what-is-a-data-usage-report/

 

  1. MHRA rules require medical devices to have appropriate pre-approved procedures in place to confirm they’re working as expected, and to ensure any conceivable failures have mitigations considered in advance. The New Scientist article confirms they do not have those approvals as algorithms in their software develop.

Google Deepmind – part 1

 

[this piece covers the state of play as on Sunday 8th May. It may be updated or replaced as new facts emerge]

If you are unwell: seek medical attention. These issues should not prevent you getting the care you need. The below discussion only relates to one Trust, the Royal Free in London, for all patient hospital events since sometime in 2010.

Last summer, following medConfidential’s work on care.data, Dame Fiona Caldicott was asked to review consent in the NHS. That report has still not been published, and provides recommendations. Patients should be able to know every way data has been used, as a condition of using that data – contracts shouldn’t allow secrets from patients.

Following a New Scientist article, there’s been a lot of press discussion about google deepmind receiving over 5 years of detailed medical data from the Royal Free NHS Trust in London. This project is steeped in secrecy, hiding details from patients and the public.

Concerns have not been about the patients whose information would be displayed in this app. Concerns are solely the data of the patients whose data could never be displayed in the app, as they have never had any of the blood tests (etc) it displays. That is 5 in every 6 patients. For the other 1 in 6, there is a potential benefit.

When we were first approached, our initial question was “what are they doing with this?” – details were hidden and emerged only through press investigations.

It looked like what Deepmind were doing should have been a research project – but it had not followed any ethics or research processes. It was using a dataset for the “Secondary Uses Service” – which strongly suggested this was a secondary use.

Data can be used for direct care – the care given to you by a doctor or other clinician. It is also used for other purposes, called “secondary uses”. These include purposes such as research, and the design of models for calling people in for screening (including for detection of kidney problems).

The New Scientist published last Friday, and the question remained unanswered until Wednesday. In an appearance on Radio 4, it emerged that the reason they had followed none of the research processes was simple: it wasn’t research.  It was claimed to be for direct care. The Professor speaking goes on to detail the limits that clinical rules and ethics put on who can access data for direct care.

As a result, on Wednesday afternoon, the question changed to Who is the direct care (ie clinical) relationship between?

Deepmind have made a case that they will look after the data – we’ve no reason to question that different point. This is not about losing data, it’s about whether they should have had most of it in the first place. What data should they have, and how should they have got it?

To answer that question, it has to be clear what they are doing. It is not.

More generally, to have confidence, patients should know how data about them has been used. What is Deepmind hiding in this case? And why? Will they give a full accounting of how they’ve used patient data, and what for, and what happened in direct care as a result?

Every data flow in the NHS should be consensual, safe, and transparent.

Why does google think what it does with the medical history of patients can be secretive, invasive, and possibly harmful?

Throughout most of medConfidential’s work, we are able  to say “opting out will not affect the care you receive”, because large amounts of work have been done by all sides to make sure it does not. If you opt out of “secondary uses” of your data released by HSCIC, it does not affect care compared to someone who did not opt out. Due to the lack of process, and the corners cut by google deepmind avoiding all the relevant processes, that may not necessarily be true. We hope the Trust will clarify what their opt out does. If you didn’t want your data handed to google for speculative purposes, what happens if you get injured and show up at the Royal Free’s A&E? How is your care affected? Did they cut that corner too?

Patients should not be punished for deepmind’s cut corners.

Scalpels Save Lives

Our friends in the research world promote that #datasaveslives, and it does, just like scalpels do.

To be completely clear, deepmind have said that their project is “not research”. That’s why they didn’t follow any research processes. There are 1500 projects which followed the proper processes and appear on the “approved data releases” register – the Deepmind project is not one of them.

Data, and good data hygiene, is as much a requirement of a modern hospital as sterile scalpels. Following the right processes to provide sterile instruments is not seen as an “unnecessary burden”, even if accountants may wish to cut costs due to the expense. Scalpels have to be sterile for a very good reason.

Similarly, processes put in place to protect data are around the same level of importance as adequate cleaning. It may seem like an unnecessary burden to some. Just as too little cleaning will cause problems that clearly demonstrate the necessity of what was previously decried as too much. Those who cut corners are rarely the ones who suffer from the decision. There is a fundamental difference between causation and correlation

Deepmind seem to be a powerful new tool.

Were it was an instrument to be used in surgery, it would not be enough for it to be powerful and new, it must also be safe. Otherwise the harm can be significant.

Rather than clean and safe, if seems deepmind is covered in toxic waste.

It’s not that deepmind couldn’t go through the processes to ensure safety. We don’t know why they didn’t.

Deepmind might be a better instrument, or it might be the new nightmare drug. Technology tools aren’t a panacea. Have lessons been learnt after the “epic failure” of “Google flu trends”?

Research, testing, and regulatory oversight is designed to prove that changes are safe. They also correct any unintended harms to patients as the process proceeds.

How much of that happened in this case? 

If Google DeepMind publish attributable and citable comments in response to these questions, we’ll link to them.

MedConfidential Update – Opt outs being honoured

If you have opted out, recently or before, your choices are now being honoured.

Thanks to all those who helped make this happen – especially you, our supporters, donors and friends.

The institutions involved did the right thing in the end, even if they tried all the other things first.

 

What just happened? Your opt out honoured

On Wednesday, the HSCIC announced that they had received permission from the Secretary of State to finally honour his promise to you. You can opt out of data leaving the HSCIC for purposes beyond your direct care, and that is what happens. When he created the opt out that you took up, NHS England, who was then responsible for it, didn’t think it would matter.

The tickbox that you and 1.2 million other people filled in is now being honoured. The announcement says it must be done by this time next week; in practice, we are happy that this is effective with immediate effect.

Until the public consultation on the Caldicott Review, there are a small number of narrow temporary exceptions (3), and some temporary gray areas (5). But in the main, it is now done. If any of those concerns are particularly concerning to you, please let us know. We’ll be writing to HSCIC with some clarification questions next week.

The next hospital dataset to be released will be the cleaned up “full year” data, which replaces past each month parts for April 2015 to March 2016. This is the critical release which really matters. Consent will be respected for this release, and data about those who have opted out will not be included.

The HSCIC has also undertaken with the Information Commissioner to reissue the 2014 – 2015 data to those who already received it. By contract, they are required to replace old data with new.  That undertaking is the direct result of a medConfidential complaint to the ICO.

GPs have been able to honour their part since you gave them the form.

In effect, for current and future projects, as much as it could have been, it is as if your opt out, for data leaving HSCIC for purposes beyond your direct care, was honoured in April 2014.

What’s next?

The announcements this week are not the end of this process – there is a great deal left to do.

The Caldicott Review of Consent is going to propose a comprehensive and permanent solution. That solution should satisfy concerned patients into the long term, resolve the grey areas and simplifies the whole thing. It will be the subject of a public consultation, and then legislation.

But as of Wednesday, the current state is now consensual, increasingly safe, and somewhat transparent. Reducing the number of copies of data that are made will reduce the number that can be lost or stolen. More transparency will mean that you will know that your wishes have been honoured – you wont have to trust they have.

What else?

If you’ve previously had a discussion with your MP on this topic, you may wish to get back in touch with them and thank them for their help, now that the Department of Health has done the right thing, and your wishes are being respected.

MPs often hear about problems, and less often hear about what happened as a result of their help, especially in a long term project like this has been. (You should probably make clear that this is a thank you note – it might confuse their busy offices if it’s unclear…) Also, there was an election in the interim, and some MPs will have changed.

For us, it’s not getting any quieter. There are other organisations that don’t wish to act as if their world has changed. Most seriously, there are a few other projects that see the style-first approach of care.data as a handbook, not a cautionary tale…

It never ends. But this week, a lot got better as a result of our work and your help. Thank you for your support until now, and hopefully into the future.

 

 

PS – our especially deep gratitude to all those who donations also helped. We couldn’t have done this without you.

Data Usage Reports: Data derivation receipts from data processors

[this post will be amended slightly following the release of the Caldicott Review]

Some data processors wish to start getting ready for the introduction of Data Usage Reports. Data controllers will be the subject of a future post. For reporting of new knowledge created, existing reporting processes should be used.

For data processors that make data copying decisions based on instructions, the relevant component is simply the creation of an electronic receipt confirming the instructions, and the individuals whose data was copied.

It should be entirely derivable from audit materials, and require no ongoing extra work where there are audit systems. Below, we show the output manually, via a spreadsheet (excel) and, for the technical implementators, structured form.

The details

There are two parts of the receipt:

  1. The details of the data flow: the what, where, when, why. (these probably don’t change often, so regular updates may omit them)
    Organisation: “recipient organisation”
    Date: 2016-04-01
    Project title: “one line name” optional
    Description: “3 sentences about what/why” optional
    URL: a web link for more information optional
    legal basis for flow: optional
    postcode: (if relevant, for consented direct care access) optional
  2. The individual level identifiers for those individuals (the who). These being the identifiers that the processor was provided with (which in all likelihood should have been changed before the data was passed on)

    Identifiers as received by this processor
    785481E8-0BC1-4641-8ED7-D4D8D22C8AF2
    9B4E89F4-46E1-4D2B-8390-BBC728ABDA8D
    096E8894-1F69-45C3-AAF1-FBF4CF0E8313
    DFCF3B06-901C-407D-AB69-63E6D706C14A
    C39B1756-26A7-4200-96F4-284924AFE6E3
    B0F0A37A-CABD-404E-9256-796A69CD179D
    CE83E652-C44E-4D4F-86E0-2C9CBC49EB4D
    DBFB867B-08F9-4AD0-B05E-B947E39E31FF
    A947B578-A51F-464A-BD49-41C7956F2F8C
    08A015FA-D9A5-4FE8-BAAF-879FA84F50D8
    653ba56b1f21ad8bf7d4e30cc2fa4b1a10e4603c
    25fd81548b61dc0e0abf19c1809c7941a8ac15fc
    81811f9e9c698d5320f9069c35550e783c28806d
    726fe5e2f816c879169b38fe9cef944bcf898d10
    63c18e85a12dccc5304c88c847e3b85a33cd44ff
    39b17ecdab874579538afa2ebb3b333e63b08846
    2fc47b8ca79e381e598adfc5ef956b3596ff5853
    a85c70ebf68bda26df3088eee4fb890a7b2443e2
    b8feb487d136d1bce44e263f970a182b07061fc8
    d8045b84bc64d6f8a93b6820bfdecce9e1c980c7


Phrased like that, you can see it’s not particularly complicated.


Production of a data usage report is simply the information from receipts, with the existing information on release decisions and publications, transformed for the citizen.

If you’re interested, we’re happy to also talk to you about how to use data usage reporting.

Data use in the rest of Government: Where is the consultation on any ethics?

Where is the consultation on any ethics?

As care.data was in the NHS bureaucracy, this consultation is about doing more of what Government been doing already: Not better sharing, just more copying.

If this wasn’t about databases, the same consultation could be had about buying more filing cabinets, ink, and scribes. Continue reading

Data in the rest of Government: Put data to good use?

{this is a background reference blog post, ahead of more on the Cabinet Office’s data copying consultation. The call to action will be in the next newsletter.}

Let’s make data easy to put to good use” says the Cabinet Office. But good for whom? Good for the civil service? Good for each citizen? Who makes sure the balance is right?

Care.data was claimed as a “good use” of data. The details showed it to be something radically different. The Cabinet Office consultation launched last week is about bureaucracy as usual. The mantra is reform, but the reform is to bring all the benefits to Government, and the downsides for citizens.

Digital transformation, this is not.

Continue reading